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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Master's Liability for Torts of His Agents.
The defendant corporation employed five men, including the man-
ager, who had general authority over the store, in one of its chain
grocery stores. One afternoon a school boy, the manager, and two
other employees, to amuse themselves, took a rifle (which the school
boy had brought to the store) to the basement for target practice. Some
of the shots penetrated a wooden door which opened upon the street
and one shot killed the plaintiff's intestate who was passing. The
plaintiff now sues the defendant corporation for the wrongful death
of his intestate. Held, the employees were not acting in the scope of
employment and therefore were not the agents of the defendant so as to
make the defendant liable for their acts. There is no absolute duty to
control one's employees, but such duty may arise after knowledge of
improper conduct. When the manager turned away to frolic, he was
no longer in the employment of the defendant and therefore his knowl-
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edge was not imputed to the defendant, so the defendant had no notice
of the improper conduct of its employees and therefore was not liable.1
The liability of the master for the torts of his servants is usually
based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.2 Recovery is allowed
on this ground when it is found that the servant was acting in the scope
of his employment 3 when he inflicted the injury. The courts have been
unable to decide with any degree of unanimity just what constitutes
"scope of employment." 4  However, the courts generally agree that a
servant is no longer acting in the scope of his employment when he turns
away to frolic or to take part in sport.5 Nevertheless it has been held
that, where the servant was performing his duty at the same time, he
was acting in the scope of his employment.6 All courts would agree
that the employees in the instant case were not acting in the scope of
their employment when they inflicted the injury.
There are many instances where the master has been held liable for
the torts of his servants even though committed outside the scope of em-
ployment. The most common of these is where the master owes an
affirmative or special duty which has been violated through some act of
his servant. 7 It has been said that such an affirmative or special duty
is owed by railroads to their passengers s by hotels to their guests,9 and
occasionally it has been held that other places of business owe to their
'Ford v. Grand Union Co., 268 N. Y. 243, 197 N. E. 266 (1935).
12 MEcHEcm, AGEc (2d ed. 1914) §1857.
'RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §228 defines the scope of employment as fol-
lows: "(1) The conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if but only
if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by
a purpose to serve the master. (2) It is a question of fact, depending upon the
extent of departure, whether or not an act, as performed in its setting of time
and place, is so different in kind from that authorized, or has so little relation to
the employment, that it is not within its scope."
'Notes (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 441; (1931) 6 Wis. L. Rv. 239; (1931) 10
TEx. L. REv. 69.
'American Ry. Express Co. v. Davis, 152 Ark. 258, 238 S. W. 50 (1922);
Sullivan v. Louisville & N. Ry., 115 Ky. 447, 74 S. W. 171 (1903) (foreman of the
switching crew not in the scope of employment 'when he placed a torpedo under
the wheels of a locomotive in sport) ; Goupiel v. Grand Trunk Ry., 96 Vt. 191,
118 Atl. 586 (1922) (engineer in sport moved the engine for the purpose of ex-
ploding torpedo to frighten section hand held not in the scope of employment);
Note (1924) 30 A. L. R. 693.
1 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 Atl. 22 (1931)
(employee sent a rat instead of bread) ; Soderland v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry.,
102 Minn. 240, 113 N. W. 449 (1907) (employees used hand-car in the course of
employment; on this occasion they speeded up the hand-car "just for fun"; held
to be in the course of employment).Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 518.
8 Ramsden v. Boston & Albany Ry., 104 Mass. 117 (1870) ; Hull v. Ry., 210
Mass. 159, 96 N. E. 58 (1911); Strother v. Aberdeen & Ashboro Ry., 123 N. C.
197, 31 S. E. 386 (1898) ; Craker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 36 Wis. 657 (1875).
Contra: Dugger v. Central of Ga. Ry., 36 Ga. App. 782, 138 S. E. 266 (1927).
'Clancy v. Barker 71 Neb. 83, 98 N. W. 44 (1904) ; Note (1931) 45 HARv. L.
Rev. 342. Contra: Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed. 161 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904).
184 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
customers a similar duty.'0 Courts have by implication read into bail-
ment contracts an assumption of risk by the bailee," thus holding him
liable for the torts of his servants committed on the bailed chattel out-
side the scope of .their employment.' 2 It should be pointed out that a
special duty is found only in cases where there was a contractual rela-
tionship or the injured party was treated as an invitee. In the principal
case there was no such relationship between the plaintiff's intestate and
the defendant out of which a special or affirmative duty could arise.
The master's liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment is based in some instances upon the dangcrous
instrumentality doctrine. The theory is that the master has intrusted
his servant with a dangerous instrument which is likely to be misused."3
The master's liability under this doctrine is usually limited to cases
where the servants use the dangerous instrument "playfully."1 4  It is
evident that the defendant in the principal case could not be held under
tbs doctrine because not only was the rifle which was used by the em-
ployees not intrusted to them by the defendant, but the defendant knew
nothing about it.
In some cases the principal is liable for the acts of third persons
where there is an apparent agency on the doctrine of estoppel. 15 The
same doctrine has been used to hold the master liable for the torts of his
servants outside of the scope of employment where the master has
placed the servant in a position of apparent authority.' 0 In both of the
above circumstances the doctrine of estoppel can only be applied where
there is some reliance by the injured party1T (however remote)-which
is clearly not present in the instant case.
It is evident that the master may be liable for his own negligence
even though the injury was inflicted by the servant while acting outside
10 Saloons have been said to owe their customers a special duty. Curran v.
Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 1124 .(1903) ; Beike v. Carroll, 51 Wash. 395, 98
Pac. 1119 (1909). A taxi company owes its patrons a special duty. Korner v.
Cosgrove, 108 Ohio St. 484, 141 N. E. 267 (1923). For other examples, see Notes
(1927) 21 Il. L. Rav. 619; (1928) 27 MIcH L. REv. 229.
1Note (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 342.
"National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Sturteuant-Jones Co., 116 Ohio 299, 156 N. E.
446 (1927) ; Note (1927) U. oF CIN. L. REv. 482. Contra: Fireman Fund Ins. Co.
v. Schrieher, 150 Wis. 42, 135 N. W. 507 (1912).
'Horack, The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine (1916) 26 YALE L. J. 224.
" Robinson v. Melville Mfg. Co., 165 N. C. 495, 81 S. E. 681 (1914); Note(1928) 42 HARv. L. R a. 269. The same reasoning is used in cases where the
master confides to his servants duties which involve the use of force, but in these
cases the result is reached by saying that the act is in the scope of employment.
New Ellerslie Fishing Club v. Stewart, 123 Ky. 8, 93 S. W. 598 (1908); Sturgis
v. Kansas City Ry.,-Mo. App.-, 228 S. W. 861 (1921).
" Fields Ins. Co. v. Evans, 36 Ohio App. 153, 172 N. E. 702 (1929); Notes
(1931) 29 MicH. L. REv. 640; (1933) 12 N. C. L. REv. 49.
"62 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §720; HuFFcurr, AGE1CY (2d ed. 1901)
§103; REsTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) §261.
"Notes (1928) 27 MicH. L. REv. 697; (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 827.
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of his employment. The master would be negligent if he failed to
prevent his servants from acting on his premises in such a way as to
endanger others, when he knows or should know of such conduct.' 8
Thus in the instant case the court admits that if the corporation had
known of the acts of its employees and then had failed to take some
action to prevent it, it would have been liable. It could only have
knowledge through its agents. Knowledge which an agent has will
only be imputed to his principal (as a general rule) if it is gained while
the agent is acting in the scope of his employment.' 9 The doctrine of
imputing an agent's knowledge to his principal is based upon the agent's
duty to communicate all material information to his-principal and a
presumption that he has done so. 20 In the principal case the manager,
by going to the basement and taking part in the target practice, had
departed from the scope of employment and so his knowledge concern-
ing the target practice was not imputed to his employer. The presump-
tion of communication which is the basis of the above doctrine cannot
apply to knowledge of the agent's own misdoings in departing from the
scope of his employment. The decision seems especially hard in re-
lieving the defendant of liability because the manager took an active
part-when his duty was to prevent just such conduct by the other
employees. It is to be remembered that the manager by taking part in
the practice was doing two things at once: (1) he was stepping out of
his employment of the corporation-thereby relieving the corporation
of liability for his acts and knowledge, and, at the same time, (2) he
was starting on a mission which would result in a wrong to the plaintiff's
intestate. Even though it seems hard, the court by applying the recog-
nized rules of the law of agency could not logically have reached any
other result. The plaintiff still has his remedy against the employees as
individuals.
ROBERT BOOTH.
Contracts-Mortgages-Right of Second Mortgage Bondholders to
Prevent Impairment of Security by Wilful Breach of Contract.
In 1929 A Gas Co. contracted to sell to B Manufacturing Co. its
entire output of natural gas for a period of years. The A Co. was or-
ganized solely for the purpose of executing this contract, which was its
principal asset. To finance its operations, A Co. issued $1,500,000 of
bonds secured by a first mortgage on all of its assets, expressly including
among the mortgaged assets the contract with B Co., and $500,000 of
"Hoyle v. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E. 794 (1910).
"'Notes (1927) 1 So. CALIF. L. Ray. 176; (1928) 15 VA. L. Rav. 782; (1931)
11 B. U. L. Rv. 537; (1932) 10 N. C. L. Rlv. 68.
21Ibid.
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bonds secured by a second mortgage on the same assets. In 1932 the
holders of the second mortgage bonds filed an intervening petition in a
receivership proceeding against A Co. in which they alleged that the
B Co. had breached its contract with A Co., thereby causing A Co. to
default in payments on its bonds; that B Co. had then secretly bought
92% of the first mortgage bonds at prices greatly reduced by the de-
fault, intending thereby to force a foreclosure of the first mortgage,
buy in the mortgaged property, including the right of action against
itself, and thus effectively relieve itself of all liability for breach of
contract. The second mortgagees contended that, by reason of the rela-
tionship of the parties and the conduct of the B Co., a fiduciary duty
devolved on the B Co. to account as trustee to the A Co. for the first
mortgage bonds, the 'bonds so purchased to be surrendered by the B Co.
upon being reimbursed for the actual outlay incurred in their purchase.
Held, there was no fiduciary relationship between the A Co. and the
B Co. Therefore the B Co. took the bonds with all the rights of an
ordinary holder, including the right to foreclose in the event of default.1
A dissenting opinion found a fiduciary relationship in the contract and
dealings between the parties.2
In seeking protection from the effects of B Co.'s conduct, the second
mortgagees invoked the familiar rule that where one party to a fiduciary
relationship buys in an outstanding interest in the subject matter, a
constructive trust will be imposed in favor of the other party.8 Thus,
the court's decision in the principal case was made to turn on the ques-
tion whether a fiduciary relationship was involved. The concept of
"fiduciary," one of the most flexible known to the law, has been invoked
in a great variety of situations.4 Reluctance to interfere unduly with
'Bell v. Wayne United Gas Co., 181 S. E. 609 (W. Va. 1935). The majority
further argued that, even had there been a fiduciary duty with respect to the bonds
purchased by the B Co., the bonds would not be held for the benefit of the A Co.
or the junior lienors, since "their rights were subject to the bonded debt at face
value. A different situation might arise at the suit of a complaining former owner
of the bonds." In thus noting the obvious injury caused by B Co.'s conduct toward
the former owners of the first mortgage bonds, the majority seems to lose sight
of the more obscure injury to A Co. and to the junior lienors, resulting from the
fact that B Co. has now acquired control of the foreclosure proceedings. The
dissent clearly points this out. "By purchasing these bonds, the glass companies
[B Co.] presumably placed themselves in position to control the sale of the gas
company's [A Co.'s] properties, and, incidentally, to get rid of the troublesome gas
contract."
'Id. at 619. "Confidence was reciprocal. The gas company [A Co.] spent
large sums of money on the basis of that confidence, and when default on its bonds
seemed imminent, June 1, 1932, full disclosure of that situation was made to the
glass companies [B Co.]."
'Trice v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); Consumers Co. v.
Parker, 227 Ill. App. 552 (1923) ; Wells v. Cline, 19 Ohio App. 165 (1924) ; 3
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTMS (1935) §485.
'Moto Meter Co. v. National Guage & Equipment Co., 31 F. (2d) 994 (D. Del,
1929) (a fiduciary relationship held to exist between owner of royalties and owner
NOTES AND COMMENTS
arm's length dealing has perhaps retarded the extension of the concept ;5
yet even if parties to ordinary commercial contracts have not usually
been considered to be in such a relationship, the type of "entire-output"
bargain encountered in the principal case does entail a large degree of
mutual trust. Such contracts have proven to be commercially useful
and should be encouraged.6
But if it is stretching traditional concepts too far to say that the
contract in the instant case in itself created a fiduciary relationship,
would B Co.'s 'breach create such a status? The majority decided that
it would not. When the facts of the case, however, are considered inde-
pendently of a constructive-trust formula, the relevancy of the court's
whole discussion of the "fiduciary" issue seems doubtful. The court
might have come more directly to grips with the merits of the case had
it considered instead the question whether B Co.- may properly be
allowed to take advantage of the result of its own breach of contract to
effectively escape from paying damages for that breach and even per-
haps to make a tidy profit on the side.7 The court discusses the case in
terms of "fiduciary relationships" and "constructive trusts" at least in
part because these are the traditional concepts which are most readily
suggested by the facts of the principal case. The difficulty is that the
principal case presents an unusual situation which may not readily be
fitted into the traditional bounds of these well-known legal formula,
and raises a doubt as to their validity.
The concrete results of imposing a trust in favor of A Co. would
have been: first, to prevent B. Co.'s profiting from its breach; and sec-
ond, to give a windfall to A Co. and the second mortgagees at the ex-
pense of the original owners of the first mortgage bonds. Aversion to
of patents; in this case the constructive-trust formula was invoked to aid the
plaintiff out of a procedural difficulty) ; Johnson v. Umsted, 64 F. (2d) 316 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1933) (illiterate negro woman and financial adviser); Bradley Co. v.
Bradley, 37 Cal. App. 263, 173 Pac. 1011 (1918) (confidential agent) ; Miller v.
Henderson, 140 Kan. 46, 33 P. (2d) 1098 (1934) (surviving partner and widow
of deceased partner) ; Lewis v. Schafer, 163 Okla. 94, 20 P. (2d) 1048 (1933)
(employee reposing confidence in employer) ; Note (1932) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 52
(a discussion of West Virginia cases on what constitutes a confidential or fiduciary
relationship.)
Thayer v. Leggett, 229 N. Y. 152, 128 N. E. 133 (1920) ("Between the assignor
and the assignee of a lease no relation of trust or confidence arises. They deal
at arm's length." Therefore a subtenant who obtained a new lease as against his
lessor was not subject to a constructive trust.)
'For a discussion of the commercial advantages and the legal position of such
contracts, see Havighurst and Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts (1932)
27 ILL. L. lev. 1.
" If the court in refusing to find a fiduciary relationship did so as a result of a
preliminary determination that it would be practically undesirable to so encroach
upon the laissez-faire theory of contract, one might merely agree or disagree with
such a determination. An opinion written in such terms would, however, seem
more desirable than the probably legalistic "fiduciary" rationale which hides from
view the really determining factors.
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the second result undoubtedly influenced the court against imposing
the trust on B Co.8 But the court's refusal to act merely left the wind-
fall with B Co. and gave no solace to the original owners of the first
mortgage bonds. In either event their position would be the same. It
would seem preferable at least to prevent B Co. from succeeding in its
savage business methods.I The objections raised, both doctrinal and practical, to imposing a
trust in the instance case lead to the inquiry whether a better solution
might not have been possible without resort to the constructive-trust
formula. In their intervening petition the second mortgagees, in addi-
tion to asking that the trust be imposed on B Co., asked for an adjudica-
tion of the breach of contract on the part of B Co. and a decree for the
amount of the resultant damages. Instead, would it not have been a
better course for the intervening petitioners simply to have asked for a
decree that B Co. specifically perform its contract with A Co.? The
fiction that damages would be adequate could hardly be indulged here,
since, even though damages were collected, the inevitable result of allow-
ing B Co. to breach the contract will be the financial ruin of the A Co.
The difficulties of supervising the carrying out of the specific per-
formance decree should not be so great as to prevent the court from
giving that remedy. The result of specific performance should be to
restore the solvency of the A Co. and allow it to cure the default on its
bond. 9 Foreclosure of the first mortgage would be prevented, so that,
even should B Co. retain the bonds,1 0 it could no longer by that method
effectively cancel the court's action. Both the second mortgagees and
A Co. should thus secure complete protection.
F. M. PARKER.
'Bell v. Wayne United Gas Co., 181 S. E. 609, 618 (W. Va. 1935). According
to the majority, " . . . it is difficult to say by what reasoning the bonds would be
held for the benefit of the Wayne United Gas Co. [A Co.] or of its junior lienors.
Neither of them had any property rights in the bonds ......
'There was no specific finding of fact to this effect, but it was alleged in the
bill of complaint "that the money to be derived from a proper performance of the
contract on the part of the buyers would be ample to meet all the requirements of
the Wayne United Gas Co. [A Co.]."
"' Of course, a decree of specific performance would also result in restoring the
'full value of the first mortgage bonds now in the hands of B Co. The inquiry
would then arise as to whether there was any remedy which the original owners
of those bonds might assert against B Co. This question was left open by the
court in the instant case, the court saying, "A -different situation might arise at the
suit of a complaining former owner of the bonds if it were shown that, in con-
sequence of fraudulent conduct of the glass companies [B Co.], bonds had been
parted with at a price substantially lower than their true and actual value. In such
a case it might be said that the glass companies, if their fraud were shown, held
the bonds as trustees for the former owner." The complaining former ownef
might also obtain relief under some analogy to the modern "economic compulsion"
doctrine by which a transaction, induced by a threatened breach of contract which
would result in irreparable damages, may be set aside. Hazelhurst Oil Mill &
Fertilizer Co. v. U. S., 42 F. (2d) 331 (Ct. Cl. 1930) ; cf. Hartsville Oil Mill v.
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Guaranty-Payment and Discharge.
One S entered into a continuing guaranty, whereby she guaranteed
protection to the plaintiff bank against any debts or liabilities incurred
'by the Company. S died, and at the time of her death, the plaintiff held
four notes of the Company covered by the guaranty. Later the plaintiff
took the Company's demand note and credited the proceeds thereof to
the account of the Company. Against the credit so created, the Com-
pany drew a check and the proceeds were applied to the four notes held
by the bank. The discounted note of the Company recited that the four
notes already held by the bank should be retained as collateral security.
The plaintiff now brings suit against the executrix of the estate of S on
the contract of guaranty covering the four old notes; to which the
defendant entered three pleas: the check was payment of the indebted-
ness evidenced'by the old notes; the new note was a change in the obliga-
tion and, being made after the death of the guarantor, operated as a
discharge; and the demand note was in effect an extension of time.
Held, the directed verdict for the plaintiff below should be affirmed on
the grounds that there was no discharge from, nor change in, the
original indebtedness, nor was there a binding extension of time.1
Clearly, the taking of the demand note was not such an extension as
would release the guarantor, since the note was instantly due and suit
might have 'been brought thereon at the moment that it was delivered.2
Whether there was a payment and discharge of the old notes depends
upon the intent of the parties, expressed or implied,3 and it seems that
the court erred in not submitting that question to the jury. It is well
settled that a renewal note does not amount to payment, nor does it
raise a presumption of payment.4 Moreover the fact that the demand
U. S., 271 U. S. 43, 46 Sup. Ct. 389, 70 L. ed. 822 (1926). Thus, had the B Co.
threatened to breach its contract with A Co., and so destroy the value of the bonds,
in order to induce the former owner to part with the bonds at a low price, a good
case of "economic compulsion" might have been made out. When the B Co., in-
stead of merely threatening a breach, adopted the more vicious course of actually
consummating a breach, and then taking advantage of the natural result of that
breach to acquire the bonds, should not the original owners of the first mortgage
bonds still be protected?
'Sulter v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 181 S. E. 694 (Ga. App. 1935).
' Farmers' State Bank of Lisbon v. Fausett, 54 N. D. 696, 210 N. W. 638 (1926)
(demand renewal note merely evidenced an indulgence in pressing collection which
could have been given under the original notes) ; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Donk,
178 S. W. 113 (Mo. 1915) (demand renewal note was simply a change of form of
evidence of the indebtedness).
' Malsons Bank v. Bermon, 224 Mich. 609, 195 N. .W 75 (1923) ; Lancaster v.
Stanfield, 191 N. C. 340, 132 S. E. 21 (1926) ; Hatten Realty Co. v. Boylies, 42
Wyo. 69, 290 Pac. 561 (1930); 3 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed.
1933) §1447.
'Bridge v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Cal. 774, 141 Pac. 375 (1914);
Bank of Benson v. Jones, 147 N. C. 419, 61 S. E. 193, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 343, and
note (1908) (presumption of non-payment). But the courts of Indiana, Mas-
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note recited that the old one should be held as collateral security tends
to show an intent that the maker's obligation was still in force,5 the new
note operating only as a suspension of the debt evidenced by the original.
The old notes would stand as security for the plaintiff bank only in the
event that the contract of guaranty was applicable to them. Had there
been payment, the liability that the contract created would have been
destroyed,6 but the Court based its decision on the fact that the with-
holding of the notes must have shown an intent for non-payment, con-
cluding that the contract was still operative. The fact that a payment
would occasion a loss of security to the creditor, in itself, raises a strong
presumption against such payment.1
An opposite intent of the parties is indicated by the bank's discount-
ing the new note and the Company's drawing a check against the credit
so created and applying it to the old note. Thus considered, the con-
tracts are essentially separate and distinct; the new note was not
founded upon the consideration of the old ones, but upon a loan newly
created by the bank's discount.8
Had the maker cashed the check at a place other than plaintiff bank
upon which said check was drawn, and then applied the cash to the old
note, doubtless there would have been a payment. Though the entire
transaction was accomplished by the check and the entries on the books,
it appears that, in effect, there was a withdrawal of the money obtained
through the discounting of the new note, and a return of the same money
sachusetts, Maine, and Vermont hold that the taking of a negotiable note for a
pre-existing, unsecured debt is presumed to be payment. 3 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) §1448.
'The mere retention of the original note by the creditor raises the presumption
that there was an intent for the original note to remain in force. German Say.
Bank v. Bates Addition Imp. Co., 111 Iowa 432, 82 N. W. 1005 (1900) ; Jackson
v. Home Nat. Bank of Baird, 185 S. W. 893 (Tex. 1916); 3 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) §1455. Even though the original note is cancelled
and surrendered, the weight of authority is that the old note is not presumed to be
paid. The minority view seems sounder. (1930) 8 TEX. L. REv.'444. But see
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Willinger, 137 Md. 46, 111 Atd. 132(1920).
I1 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed. 1905) §364.
'Savings & Loan Soc. v. Burnett, 106 Cal. 514, 39 Pac. 922 (1895) ; Cotton v.
Atlas Nat. Bank, 145 Mass. 43, 12 N. E. 850 (1887); Davis v. Thomas, 66 Neb.
26, 92 N. W. 187 (1902) ; Rushing v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 162 S. W. 460 (Tex.
1914).
'Niblock v. Adler, 209 Ill. App. 156 (1917) (notes stamped paid and sur-
rendered); Slaymaker v. Gundacker's Ex'rs, 10 S. & R. 75 (Pa. 1823) (original
note surrendered and court held that a new loan was created and new discount
paid) ; First Nat. Bank of Pawtucket v. Littlefield, 28 R. I. 411, 67 Atl. 594 (1907)
(note stamped paid). "It may well be, that by common understanding and usage,
when a note is discounted by a bank to take up a prior note held by the bank
against the party procuring the discount and the avails are credited to him, the
transaction is to be regarded as an extinguishment of the prior note, although it
may not have been actually surrendered." Andrews, J., in Phoenix Insurance Co.
v. Church, 81 N. Y. 218 at 226 (1880).
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in discharge of the old notes.9 If additional evidence of the old in-
debtedness was all that the parties intended and desired, why should
they have resorted to the circuity used when they might have effected
the same result by merely having the maker give the plaintiff bank the
new note?
In view of the conflicting evidence as to the intent of the parties, the
jury should have been left to determine the question of payment.
S. J. STERN, JR.
Injunction-Appeal as Adequate Remedy Precluding Decree
against Administrative Agency.
A broadcasting company applied to the Communications Commission
for a modification of its license so as to permit a night-time schedule.
Another broadcasting company, one of five in the immediate area whose
night-time service would thus be seriously affected, petitioned for leave
to intervene at the hearing. One of the Commission's rules permits
intervention by any person, firm, company, corporation, government
department, officer or subdivision whose interest in the subject matter
of the hearing is substantial. The petition was denied. The petitioner
then sought an injunction to prevent a hearing without its participation.
Held, bill dismissed,1 plaintiff's remedy by appeal from any order
modifying the license being plain, adequate, complete and exclusive. By
statute,2 this appeal was available to any person aggrieved or whose
interests are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission grant-
ing or refusing an application.
Injunctions against the enforcement of the decisions of administra-
tive tribunals on the merits are frequently denied where plaintiff has
failed to take advantage of provisions for administrative or judicial
review.3 Special circumstances, however, have sometimes operated to
I Letcher v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 31 Ky. 82 (1833).
1 Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. D. C. 1935).
248 STAT. 1093, 47 U. S. C. A. §402 (b) (2) (1934).
'First National Bank of Greeley v. Board of Com' s. of Weld County, 264 U. S.
450, 44 Sup. Ct. 85, 68 L. ed. 784 (1924) (tax assessment; administrative review) ;
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Commission of New York, 266 U. S. 265, 45 Sup.
Ct. 80, 69 L. ed. 279 (1924) (imposition of franchise tax; administrative review) ;
Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266,
53 Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L. ed. 1166 (1933) (respondent sought no further hearing than
that before the chief examiner) ; American Bond & Mortgage Co. v. U. S. 52 F.(2d) 318 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931) (appeal); A. Rafelson Co., Inc. v. Tug-well, Acting
Secretary of Agriculture, 79 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) (appeal) ; White v.
Federal Radio Commission, 29 F. (24) 113 (N: D. Ill. 1928) (appeal) ; Denver &
S. P. R. Co. v. Englewood, 62 Colo. 229, 161 Pac. 151 (1916) (Utilities Commis-
sion of Colorado ordered a rate in conflict with a city ordinance; appeal) ; Chicago
v. O'Connell, 278 Ill. 591, 116 N. E. 210 (1917) (order of Illinois Public Service
Commission relative to routing and equipping street railway cars; appeal) ; Lowe
v. Board of Com'rs., 156 Ind. 163, 59 N. E. 466 (1901) (construction of road;
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require an injunction notwithstanding that omission. 4
But that situation is to be distinguished from the principal case.
Here the essential question is one of due process. In the case of ChastIc-
ton Corporation v. Sinclair; the United States Supreme Court held that
the statutory provision for appeal from orders of the Rent Commission
of the District of Colurmbia was not an adequate solution of that ques-
tion. There the Rent Commission had issued an order establishing new
rental rates, and the complainants subsequently purchased the apartment
building at a foreclosure sale. No notice as was required by statute was
given to either the mortgagee or the complainants. Therefore, an injunc-
tion was sought to restrain the enforcement of the order. In granting the
injunction the Court said: "It is objected that the plaintiffs have an
adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. But apart from the fact that
it is doubtful whether the plaintiffs were not entitled to treat the order
as a nullity so far as they were concerned, it is open to equal doubt
whether in a proceeding under the law they could assail its validity....
However looked at, a bill in equity is the natural and best way of settling
the parties' rights." The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
has followed this decision in Gilbert v. SargentO and Linkins v. Sargent.7
And in Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Manufacturing Companys
the same court granted an injunction without mentioning an appeal
where the Federal Radio Commission changed the frequency of the
plaintiff's broadcasting station without notice or opportunity for a prior
hearing.
The dissent in the principal case has the better of the argument.
The Commission's denial of intervention, because petitioner had no
property right involved, was arbitrary, in violation of its own rules, and
devoid of any semblance of due process of law. The statutory appeal
from a final order was not, for three reasons, such an adequate remedy
appeal) ; Kinney v. Howard, 133 Iowa 94, 110 N. W. 824 (1917) (condemnation
proceedings; appeal) ; Nixon v. City of Burlington, 141 Iowa 316, 115 N. W. 238(1908) (paving assessment; appeal); Clay v. Independent School District, 187
Iowa 89, 174 N. W. 47 (1919) (granting a teacher's certificate; appeal).
'Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S. 196, 44 Sup. Ct. 553, 68 L. ed.
975 (1924) (writ of review did not suspend enforcement of confiscatory rate pend-
ing review) ; Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp., 268 U. S. 413, 45 Sup. Ct. 534, 69
L. ed. 1020 (1924) (rate set became confiscatory pending rehearing) ; Proctor &
Gamble v. Sherman, 2 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924) (invalid tax; Commission
had ruled against complainant; application for revision of ruling would be
formality.)
5265 U. S. 543, 44 Sup. Ct. 405, 68 L. ed. 841 (1923).
619 F. (2d) 681 (App. D. C. 1927). Plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain
order of the Rent Commission on ground he had had no notice and was not a party
to the proceedings. Held, that the objection that the remedy was by appeal from
Commission's determinations was of no avail.
"19 F. (2d) 683 (App. D. C. 1927) (the Court held that the holding in the
Gilbert Case covered this case).846 F. (2d) 612 (App. D. C. 1931).
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as would justify the refusal of an injunction against a hearing without
plaintiff's participation. (1) The Court on appeal is limited to questions
of law; the facts found by the Commission are binding. (2) Thus the
appeal comes too late to permit the plaintiff to be heard on the effects of
the admission to its area and time of a new station. (3) If the plaintiff
was a party aggrieved or adversely affected by an order granting addi-
tional broadcasting facilities for purposes of appeal, it was sufficiently
interested to be heard in the first instance.
STATON P. WILLIAMS.
Municipal Corporations-Liability of Officer for Public Funds.
Plaintiff city seeks to recover on a bond of defendant surety com-
pany, claiming that the city treasurer, for whom the bond was given,
has not faithfully discharged his duties in not paying over certain
moneys to the authorized person. As a defense defendant sets forth a
state statute authorizing councils to designate certain banks as depos-
itories in which the treasurer shall deposit city funds; a designation by
the council of plaintiff city of certain banks in which treasurer de-
posited funds, and a failure of such banks with the resulting loss of the
funds. Held, not liable for such loss notwithstanding there was no
express provision in the statute relieving the treasurer of liability in
such a case.'
The decisions of the state courts, as well as the views of the text
writers, are not harmonious concerning the character of the responsibil-
ity assumed by public officers who have custody of public funds.2 The
weight of authority, however, seems to adhere to the doctrine of strict
liability, which is known as the "insurance rule."3  It is based on
(1) public policy;4 (2) the theory that the officer is debtor for the funds
1 City of Scranton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 11 F. Supp. 986 (M. D.
Pa. 1935).
'Jordan v. Baker, 252 Ky. 40, 66 S. W. (2d) 84 (1933). Tax collector, after
having given proper bonds and security, collected certain amounts which he de-
posited in a duly designated depository which became insolvent. Held, officer not
liable, the court saying that there was a divergence of opinion as to officer's liabil-
ity, both within the same court and within different courts.
American Surety Co. v. Smith, 49 Ga. App. 40, 174 S. E. 262 (1934) (county
officer made deposit of county funds in bank which became insolvent; held, liable
as insurer); City of Fayette v. Silvey, 290 S. W. 1019 (Mo. App. 1927) (city
officer collected certain funds and deposited them in depository used by city; held,
liable as insurer when bank became insolvent) ; Ferrell v. Town of Mountain View,
127 Okla. 246, 260 Pac. 470 (1927) (city treasurer invested funds in certificates of
deposit lost by reason of bank failure; held, liable even though invested under
direction of town board) ; Jordan v. Baker, 252 Ky. 40, 66 S. W. (2d) 84 (1933),
cited supra note 2.
'American Surety Co. v. Smith, 49 Ga. App.. 40, 174 S. E. 262 (1934), cited
supra note 3 (the standard of responsibility based on public policy) ; Jordan v.
Baker, 252 Ky. 40, 66 S. W. (2d) 84 (1933), cited supra note 2 (insurance rule
based on public -policy) ; University City v. Scholl, 275 Mo. 667, 205 S. W. 631
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that he receives;5 and (3) the terms of the bond,0 which make the
officer an insurer of the funds, except where the loss was caused by an
act of God or the public enemy. 7 The origin of this rule goes back to
the time when there were few 'banks.8 A few courts have realized the
harshness of such a rule and have sought to modify this strict doctrine
by invoking the "bailee rule," which is adopted upon the theory that
the officer is only a bailee of the funds he collects and thus liable only
for the exercise of ordinary business prudence and care.9 Some state
legislatures have passed statutes similar to the one in the present case. 10
These statutes relieve the officer from strict liability either expressly or
by implication.". Some courts have taken a liberal attitude in constru-
ing these statutes' 2 and by so doing have recognized the harshness of
the insurer rule. When such a statute relieves the treasurer and his
(1918) (public policy back of strict rule saying that mayor or board of aldermen
cannot free officer by ordinance) ; Overton County v. Copeland, 96 Tenn. 296, 34
S. W. 427, 428 (1896) (officer, in some cases, held liable on broad grounds of
public policy).
'Overton County v. Copeland, 96 Tenn. 296, 34 S. W. 427 (1896), cited supra
note 4 (officer regarded as debtor for the funds that go into his hands).
'Lamb v. Dart, 108 Ga. 602, 34 S. E. 160 (1899) (condition in bond that
officer should faithfully discharge all his duties and turn funds over to his suc-
cessor which he was unable to do because of bank failure; held, liability of officer
determined by contract which is expressed in terms of his bond) ; Overton County
v. Copeland, 96 Tenn. 296, 34 S. W. 427 (1896), cited supra note 4 (officer held
liable according to terms of bond).
"American Surety Co. v. City of Thomasville, 73 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. 5th,
1934) (Georgia statute provided that mayor and aldermen would have power to
elect treasurer and prescribe his powers and duties; held, officer must ordinarily
keep funds safely in all events, and is not excused from loss unless perhaps when
caused by act of God or public enemy).
'Jordan v. Baker, 252 Ky. 40, 66 S. W. (2d) 84 (1933), cited supra note 2
(insurance rule based on public policy and having historical origin years ago when
there were few banks and cash was used instead).
'Jordan v. Baker, 252 Ky. 40, 66 S. W. (2d) 84 (1933), cited supra note 2
(bailee theory requires only exercise of ordinary business prudence and care in
preserving funds collected by him) ; York County v. Watson, 15 S. C. 1 (1880)
(bond required officer to well and truly perform his duty; held only to use of
prudence and due care when county funds deposited in solvent bank which later
failed; Overton County v. Copeland, 96 Tenn. 296, 34 S. W. 427 (1896), cited
supra note 4.
" State v. McCloud, 64 Okla. 126, 166 Pac. 1065 (1917) (the statute provided
that county commissioners should designate certain banks as depositories, that the
county treasurer was to make deposits of county funds in such banks, which banks
were to give bonds).
'Edgerton Independent Consolidated School District v. Volz, 50 S. D. 107, 208
N. W. 576, 578 (1926) (statute required treasurer to deposit county funds in banks
within the state; held, in many depository acts in this and other states it is ex-
pressly provided that a compliance with the act will relieve the treasurer from
such liability, but such express provision is not necessary to accomplish the same
result).
'American Surety Co. v. City of Thomasville, 73 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. 5th,
1934), cited supra note 7 (legislature gave mayor and aldermen power to elect
treasurer and designate his duties; held, authorities could designate depository and
when treasurer deposited funds there he was no longer responsible).
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bondsman from liability, the bank is required to give security directly
to the county,' 3 which may be in the form of a pledge of its assets. 14
North Carolina apparently follows the majority or insurer rule and
seeks to justify it on grounds of public policy, at the same time expressly
recognizing the harshness of the rule.15 However, cities and towns in
North Carolina are governed by the provisions of the county Fiscal
Control Act'0 which provides in substance that any person collecting
public funds shall deposit them with the county treasurer or with a
bank designated by the county board of commissioners, who shall re-
quire such depository to give adequate bond as security for such de-
posits.17 It would seem that North Carolina, following this statute,
would adopt the more liberal view in a case similar to the principal case.
It appears inconsistent to hold the treasurer absolutely liable on the
theory that the money became his, and, at the same time, require a bond
to be given to the city on the theory that the money belongs to it. The
more desirable procedure would be to pass statutes requiring officials
to deposit public funds in designated depositories which should furnish
security for deposits, and then release the treasurer from liability by
express provision, thus reaching the same result as the principal case.
Even in such a case there might be some objections to requiring depos-
itories to furnish security,' 8 and it might be better to have an extension
of the federal deposit insurance plan as to public deposits19 and permit
insurance for greater amounts than $5,000. There is some justification
for the harsher rule, in that, if such a rule were not followed, the door
"
1 Hinton v. State ex rel. Neal, 57 Okla. 777, 156 Pac. 161 (1916) (statute re-
quired duly designated depository to give bond securing deposits; held, treasurer
relieved from liability).
"Schomick v. Butler, 205 Ind. 305, 185 N. E. 111 (1933) (certain notes held
by bank given as security to indemnify surety on depository bond of bank holding
public deposits; held, bank may pledge its assets to protect personal sureties on its
depository bond) ; Richmond Co. v. PageTrust Co. 195 N. C. 545, 142 S. E. 786
(1928) (bank assigned certain notes to secure certificates of deposit issued by it;
held, valid); Comments (1933) 11 N. C. L. Rrv. 306; (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 608; (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 577.
2 Havens v. Lathene, 75 N. C. 505 (1876) (clerk's bond required him to account
for and pay over all money received by virtue of his office; held, liable as an
insurer in all events; imposes harsh rule as a matter of public policy).
'IN. C. CODE (1935) §2969 (n).
'
7N. C. CODE (1935) §1334 (70).
See supra note 14.
10 (1933) 11 N. C. L. REV. 201; 1934 ANN. REP. FED. DEa'. lirs. Coiu'. (If the
same state, county, town or other political subdivision or body maintains more
than one account representing funds owned by such political subdivision or body
in the same capacity and in the same right, such accounts shall be treated as a
single deposit owned by one depositor and the amount thereof, not exceeding
$5,000 in the aggregate, should be reported as eligible for insurance. In such event
it is immaterial whether such accounts represent funds for specific purposes or
general funds of such state, county, town, or other political subdivision or body.)
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would be open to fraudulent practices and evasion by public officials. 20
However, if such a rule is followed, it has been suggested that no man
of financial standing or business prudence would accept public trusts
involving the handling of public money.2 1 Considering the reasons for
stricter and more liberal views, the better conclusion would be to
authorize the deposit of funds in banks required to give security directly
to the public authority selecting the banks for deposit.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
Property-Future Interests in Chattels Personal.
S, about sixty days prior to his death, executed to his wife a deed
in due form for a tract of land, and "also all the personal property that
I own of every kind and description, including household and kitchen
property, choses in action, notes and mortgages, etc. Always reserving
to said party of the first part the complete use and control of said
property during his natural life." Upon the death of S, his sons by a
former marriage claimed an interest in the personal property, contend-
ing the deed was a nullity as to such property. Held, that "a reservation
of a life estate in personal chattels, in a deed attempting to convey them
in remainder, reserves the whole estate, and the limitation over is
void."'
Originally no legal right of property could be created in chattels
personal other than an absolute and indefeasible one; a gift for an
hour was a gift forever.2 In the middle of the seventeenth century the
distinction was made. that one could bequeath the "use" of a chattel,
which was not necessarily consumable in its use, to A for life; but A
acquired no property, he got only the "use" of the property for his life.3
By the end of the same century bequests of the chattels themselves to
A for life and then to B were sustained, but the bequests were con-
strued as giving only the "use" of the property to A while the legal
title in the form of a future interest vested in B.4 While it has long
I Officer might collude with politically-minded banks whereby the treasurer or
designating body might agree to deposit its funds in that bank in return for certain
privileges.
2 Overton County v. Copeland, 96 Tenn. 296, 34 S. W. 427, 428 (1896), cited
supra note 4.
1 Speight v. Speight, 208 N. C. 132, 179 S. E. 461 (1935).2 BROOKE ABR. DEVISE (1576) 13.3 Anonymous, March, 106, pl. 183 (K. B. 1641); Vachel v. Vachel, 1 Ch. Cas.
129 (1669); GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUrIES (3d ed. 1915) §83; KALES, Fu-
TURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS (2d ed. 1920) §107.
'Smith v. Clever, 2 Vern. 38, 59 (Ch. 1668); Hyde v. Parratt, 2 Vern. 331
(Ch. 1695); GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §84; KALES,
FuTurr INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS (2d ed. 1920) §107; see Tissen v. Tissen, 1 P. Wins.
500 (Ch. 1718); Randall v. Russell, 3 Mer. 190, 195 (Ch. 1817); 1 FEARNE, CoN-
TINGENT REMAINDERS k4th Am. ed. 1845) 404.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 197
been possible to create legal future interests in chattels personal in Eng-
land by will, it is still impossible to create such interests in that country
by deed or other instrument operating inter vivos.5
The courts of the United States, with one exception, have gone
farther than the English courts to permit the creation of legal future
interests in chattels personal by deed as well as by will.6 North Caro-
lina stands alone in adhering to the English view,7 and has steadfastly
refused to permit the creation of such interests by deed.8 Thus, in
North Carolina, where a grantor conveys chattels by deed to A for life
with a limitation over to B on A's death, it is held that A takes the
entire interest, and that the remainder to B is void.9 Likewise, as
demonstrated in the instant case, where the grantor reserves a life estate
to himself with a limitation over on his death to A, it is held that the
grantor retains the entire interest, and that the limitation of the estate
to A in futuro is void.10 At the same time, the courts of this jurisdic-
tion have consistently upheld legal future interests in chattels personal,
which are not necessarily consumable in their use, when created by will,
whether the first taker is given a life estate" or a fee defeasible. 12 The
I GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERa'UITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§829, 844; KALEs, FuruRE
INTERESTS IN ILLINoIs (2d ed. 1920) §107; see Hyde v. Parratt, 2 Vern. 331 (Ch.
1695).
'Price v. Price, 5 Ala. 578 (1843) ; Williamson v. Mason, 23 Ala. 488 (1853);
Sharman v. Jackson, 30 Ga. 224 (1859) ; Keen v. Macy, 6 Ky. 39 (1813) ; Tucker
v. Stevens, 4 S. C. Eq. 532 (1814) ; McCall v. Lewis, 13 S. C. Law 442 (1847) ;
Nix v. Ray, 16 S. C. 423 (1852) ; see Lyde v. Taylor, 17 Ala. 270 (1850) ; Jones
v. Hoskins, 18 Ala. 489 (1851) ; Kirkpatrick v. Davidson, 2 Ga. 297, 301 (1847) ;
McCall v. Lee, 120 Ill. 261 (1887); Owen v. Cooper, 46 Ind. 524 (1874); Samp-
son v. Randall, 72 Me. 109 (1881); Fuller v. Fuller, 84 Me. 475 (1892); Harris
v. McLaran, 30 Miss. 533, 568 (1855); Aikin v. Smith, 33 Tenn. 304 (1853);
Bradley v. Mosby, 3 Call. 50 (Va. 1801); GRAY, RU.E AGAINST PEmPEruInEs (3d
ed. 1915) §§91, 95; KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS (2d ed. 1920) §108;
Simes, Future Interests in Chattels Personal (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 771.
Supra note 6.
'MORDEcAi, LAW LEcTuREs (2d ed. 1916) 850, 1092.
'Cutlar v. Spiller, 3 N. C. 130 (1798); Gilbert v. Murdock, 3 N. C. 182
(1802); Dowd v. Montgomery, 4 N. C. 198 (1815); Smith v. Tucker, 13 N. C.
541 (1830) ; Hunt v. Davis, 20 N. C. 36 (1838) ; Harrell v. Davis, 53 N. C. 359
(1861).
"°Vass v. Hicks, 7 N. C. 493 (1819) ; Graham v. Graham, 9 N. C. 322 (1823);
Foscue v. Foscue, 10 N. C. 538 (1825) ; Sutton v. Hollowell, 13 N. C. 185 (1828);
Morrow v. Williams, 14 N. C. 263 (1831) ; Hunt v. Davis, 20 N. C. 36 (1838);
Foscue v. Foscue, 37 N. C. 321 (1842) ; Outlaw v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 511, 84 S. E.
811 (1915) ; Speight v. Speight, 208 N. C. 132, 179 S. E. 461 (1935), cited note 1,
supra.
U'Jones v. Zollicoffer, 4 N. C. 645 (1817); Burnett v. Roberts, 15 N. C. 81
(1833); Knight v. Wall, 19 N. C. 125 (1836); Knight v. Leak, 19 N. C. 133
(1836) ; Carter v. Spencer, 29 N. C. 14 (1846) ; MoRDEcAI, LAW LEcrTURES (2d ed.
1916) 850.
In the case of a bequest to A for life without a limitation over, there is a
reversion in the testator's heirs: Anonymous, 3 N. C. 161 (1802) ; James v. Mas-
ters, 7 N. C. 110 (1819) ; Black v. Ray, 18 N. C. 334 (1835) ; Cresswell v. Emmer-
son, 41 N. C. 151 (1849) ; see Newell v. Taylor, 56 N. C. 374 (1857).
" Threadgill v. Ingram, 23 N. C. 577 (1841); Braswell v. Morehead, 45 N. C.
26 (1852).
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Legislature, by Act of 1823,13 made an exception as to slaves, per-
mitting the creation of future interest in them by deed as well as by
will.1 4 On the basis of this statute, it seems that the Supreme Court
might have departed from its decisions to permit the creation of future
interests in other chattels -by deed; but, quite to the contrary, it regarded
this statute as a re-indorsement of the common law rule as to all other
chattels. 15
There is no sound reason why a person should be denied the priv-
ilege of creating a future interest in chattels personal by deed operating
inter vivos when at the same time he is permitted to create such interests
by will to take effect upon his death. The distinction seems purely
arbitrary.16 It is to be regretted that in the present case the court did
not seize the opportunity to hold that this common law rule had "be-
come obsolete" within the meaning of Consolidated Statutes, Section
970,17 and on that ground declare it no longer in force in this jurisdic-
'Public Laws 1823, c. 33.
"
4Tillman v. Sinclair, 23 N. C. 183 (1840); Bonner v. Latham, 23 N. C. 271(1840); Baldwin v. Joyner, 29 N. C. 123 (1846); Sutton v. Craddock, 36 N. C. 134
(1840) ; Murphy v. Merritt, 48 N. C. 37 (1855); Holton v. McAlister, 51 N. C. 12(1858). This statute was held not applicable to the case of a gift of a slave for
life of A when there was no limitation over, Newell v. Taylor, 56 N. C. 374
(1857) ; but this was remedied by an amendment to make the statute read, as fol-
lows: "Every kind of estate in slaves, be the same vested or contingent, or for
life or for years, which is allowed to be created and limited by any last will and
testament, may be created and limited by way of reservation, remainder, reversion,
or otherwise, by any written conveyance of slaves." Rev. 1854, c. 37, §21.
'Lance v. Lance, 50 N. C. 413 (1858) ; Dail v. Jones, 85 N. C. 221 (1881).
"In referring to this distinction, Mr. Kales stated, "this seems to be the law
to-day [in England] though the reason for it is not apparent." KALES, Fuuan
INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS (2d ed. 1920) §107. The basis for the distinction is his-
torical rather than logical; when the English courts altered the ancient common
law rule in the seventeenth century to permit creation of future interests by exec-
utory devises and trusts, they simply failed to relax that rule as to a mere common
law conveyance. Possibly the courts thought they had greater latitude in giving
effect to intention when expressed in wills. At any rate the later courts interpreted
this as denying the privilege of creating legal future interests by deeds, without
regard to its arbitrariness. The American courts readily departed from this rigid
law because it was unsupported by any sound legal principle and, further, because
a person should be accorded the same privilege of disposing of his property by
transfer inter vivos as he enjoys by will upon his death. See Bradley v. Mosby,
3 Call. 50 (Va. 1801). The North Carolina Legislature apparently recognized this
when it passed a statute in 1823 to permit the creation of legal future interests ill
slaves by deed as well as by will. Supra notes 13 and 14. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court was not induced by this act of the Legislature to depart from the
common law rule as to other chattels.
' N. C. CODE (1935). In holding that the court could not depart from the com-
mon law rule followed in North Carolina, Stacy, C. J., declared that "it should
be remembered, however, that [under C. S. 970] so much of the common law 'as
is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and inde-
pendence of this State . .. and which has not been ... abrogated or repealed,
or become obsolete,' is declared by C. S. 970 to be in full force and effect in thisjurisdiction." In the opinion of the writer, the arbitrary rule of denying the right
to create a future interest in chattels by deed when it is freely permitted by will,
is an "obsolete" law, which is evidenced by the fact that no other state in America
recognizes the arbitrary distinction.
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tion. Such a decision would have placed North Carolina in line with all
the other states of the Union, and, furthermore, it would have con-
stituted a return to the sound view of Blackstone that "if a man either
by deed or will limits his books or furniture to A for life, with re-
mainder over to B, this remainder is good."' 8
Although the law of North Carolina does not permit the creation of
legal future interests in chattels personal by deed, it does allow the
grantor the privilege of creating equitable future interests in such prop-
erty. This is accomplished by the establishment of a trust. So, if the
grantor wishes to make an inter vivos gift of his chattels to A, reserving
a life estate in himself, he may do so by conveying the same to a trustee
for the use of himself for life and then to A. A similar arrangement
should be resorted to when the grantor wishes to make an inter vivos
gift to A for life with a limitation over to B. In the latter case, the
conveyancer should never deed the chattel to A in trust for himself
for life and afterwards to B, because it has been held in such a situation
that A's interest was absolute and that B took nothing in equity.10
However, it has been held in a deed of a chattel to A, in trust for the
grantor for life, and at the death of the grantor, in trust for himself
(A), that A was entitled to the property upon the grantor's death. 20
Nevertheless, it seems the wiser policy to appoint a disinterested third
party as trustee of the property. Had the grantor in the instant case
resorted to the trust device, his intention would have been carried out,
and the arbitrary rule of law, by which the court considered itself
bound, would have been obviated.
THOMAs H. LEATHE.
Workmen's Compensation Act-Bar of Common Law
Recovery for Non-Compensable Injuries.
Plaintiff, employee, and defendant, employer, operated under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendant gratuitously permitted
plaintiff to use defendant's rip saw for plaintiff's personal benefit while
plaintiff was off duty. Plaintiff was injured by the saw due to the
alleged negligence of defendant. The Industrial Commission denied
compensation on the ground that the injury did not "arise out of and
in the course of" the employment. Plaintiff made no appeal from the
ruling of the Commission, but instigated suit at common law. Held:
non-suit affirmed; plaintiff and defendant were bound by the Work-
men's Compensation Act, and the remedy thereunder is exclusive.'
's 2 BL. CoMlM. *398.
"Butler v. Godley, 12 N. C. 94 (1826).
' Harrell v. Harrell, 58 N. C. 229 (1859).
1 Francis v. Carolina Wood Turning Co., 208 N. C. 517, 181 S. E. 628 (1935).
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Where employer and employee operate under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act and the employee sustains an injury which is clearly
within the scope and purview of the Act, it is universally held that the
Act is a bar to any common law recovery by the injured employee.2 If
the injuries are only partially within the scope and purview ol the Act,
the same rule is generally applied, even though the result is to give the
employee compensation for slight injuries only, and to bar his action
at common law for more serious injuries not compensable under the
Act.3 If, however, the injury, although arising out of the employment
relationship, is not within the scope and purview of the Act so that the
employee can get no compensation thereunder, the weight of authority
is to allow the employee to sue at common law. Such cases arise where
the employer has been negligent but the injury, although arising out of
and in the course of the employment, does not come within the express
or implied terms of the Act, usually because it is found not to be an
"accident" or "personal injury," or is found to be an "occupational
disease." 4
2 Hyett v. Northwestern Hospital, 147 Minn. 413, 180 N. W. 552 (1920);
Gregutis v. Waclark Wire Works, 86 N. J. L. 610, 92 AtI. 354 (1914) ; McNeely
v. Asbestos Co., 206 N. C. 568, 174 S. E. 509 (1934) ; Murray v. Wasatch Grading
Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 Pac. 940 (1929); N. C. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT
§11; N. C. CODE (1935) §8081 (r).
'Hyett v. Northwestern Hospital, 147 Minn. 413, 180 N. W. 552 (1920) (P
suffered minor injuries for which he was paid a $44 award under the Act; he also
suffered injury to a testicle rendering him totally impotent; the Act made no
provision for award except for such injuries as impaired earning power. The
court denied recovery at common law on the ground that the Act gave the ex-
clusive remedy, and said: "Matters of that character are proper elements of
damage in the negligence action, but our Compensation Act makes no provision for
a consideration thereof in the award to an injured employee, even though they
may constitute his major or principal grievance.") ; Morris v. Muldoon, 190 App.
Div. 689, 180 N. Y. Supp. 319 (1st Dept. 1920) ("If, however, in every case where
there could be found some injury not mentioned under the schedule of section 15
of the act, there is a separate right of action at common law for the damages sus-
tained thereby, the Compensation Law would become a farce, and a recovery
could be had under the Compensation Law, with the right of action still existing
for the injuries not mentioned in the schedule.") ; Farnum v. Garner Print Works
& Bleachery, 184 App. Div. 911, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1079 (2d Dept. 1908) (memoran-
dum decision), aff'd without opinion, 229 N. Y. 544,129 N. E. 912 (1920) (Appel-
late Division dismissed on the ground that sole remedy was under the Act, although
it did not appear whether there were any minor injuries compensable thereunder) ;
Smith v. Baker, 157 Okla. 155, lIP. (2d) 132 (1932) ; Freese v. John Morrell &
Co., 58 S. D. 634, 237 N. W. 886 (1931). But cf. Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box
Factory, 143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (1918) (apparently the only damage here com-
pensable under the Act was the disability for the period in the hospital while being
treated for the major injury which was not covered by the Act, and for which
common law recovery was allowed. Hence, perhaps this case should be cited as
in accord with the authorities cited in note 4, infra). A number of states have
amended their Acts to allow compensation for cases where formerly only a part
of the injuries were compensable. N. C. WORKIMEN'S CoMPEsAAroN Acr §31,
last paragraph.
'Kendrickson v. Continental Fibre Co., 3 Harr. 304, 136 Atl. 375 (Super. Ct.,
Del. 1926) ; Echord v. Rush, 124 Kan. 521, 261 Pac. 820 (1927) ; Jellico Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 684, 247 S. W. 972 (1923) ; Smith v. International High Speed
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A similar problem as to common law recovery against the employer
is raised if the exclusion from compensation under the Act is by virtue
of the term "arising out of and in the course of" the employment. The
problem does not, however, occur very often because in most cases
where the employee is denied compensation on this ground some third
party or the employee himself is usually to blame and the employer is
not.6 It is only the exceptional case where the employer's negligence is
the cause of an injury not "arising out of and in -the course of" the
employment. If such is the situation there is good authority for allow-
ing the employee to recover at common law.6 The important issue
would appear to be whether the injured party was an employee at the
Steel Co., 98 N. J. L. 574, 120 AUt. 188 (1923) ; Trout v. Wickwire Spencer Steel
Corp., 195 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; Jones v. Rinehart & Dennis Co., 113
W. Va. 414, 168 S. E. 482 (1933). Occupational disease: Zajkowski v. American
Steel & Wire Co., 258 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); Kane v. Federal Match Corp.,
5 F. Supp. 507 (M. D. Pa. 1934) ("Section 303 of the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act does not affect the release of an employee's common-law right
of action for injuries against his employer, except within the scope of the act.
The mere fact that the act deals with one phase of the relationship between em-
ployer and employee cannot possibly be construed as meaning that every other
obligation existing between employer and employee is renderd a nullity.") ; Don-
nelly v. Minneapolis Mfg. Co., 161 Minn. 240, 201 N. W. 305 (1924) ; Barrencotto
v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934). Contra: Webb v. Tubize-
Chatillon Corp., 45 Ga. App. 744, 165 S. E. 775 (1932); Mabley & Carew Co. v.
Lee, 129 Ohio St. 69, 193 N. E. 745 (1934). If the injury is covered by the Act
but is not compensable, common law action will be barred. Repka v. Fedders
Mfg. Co., 239 App. Div. 271, 267 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dept. 1933) ; cf. Shanahan
'v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469, 114 N. E. 795 (1916). The employee
in these actions may be defeated by the common law defense of assumption of risk.
Wager v. White Star Candy Co. Inc., 217 App. Div. 316, 217 N. Y. Supp. 173
(3d Dept. 1926).
'White v. Eastern Mfg. Co., 120 Me. 62, 112 Atl. 841 (1921) ; Ballman v.
D'Arcy Spring Co., 221 Mich. 582, 192 N. W. 596 (1923); Morey v. City of
Battle Creek, 229 Mich. 650, 202 N. W. 925 (1925); Adams v. Uvalde Asphalt
Paving Co., 205 App. Div. 784, 200 N. Y. Supp. 886 (3d Dept. 1923) ; Pederson &
Voechting v. Kromrey, 201 Wis. 599, 231 N. W. 267 (1930). Hence the em-
ployee's only chance may be to recover under the Act where he does not have to
prove negligence. In a great many of the cases arising under this term the finding
is that the injury did "arise out of and in the course of" the employment; then, of
course, the Act governs and all common law rights and defenses are eliminated.
See cases cited note 2, supra.
'National Biscuit Co. v. Litzby, 22 F. (2d) 939 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; Kendall
Lumber Co. v. State, 132 Md. 93, 103 Atl. 141. (1918) ; Conrad v. Youghiogheny
& Ohio Coal Co., 107 Ohio St. 387, 140 N. E. 482 (1923) ; Collins v. Troy Laundry
Co., 135 Ore. 580, 297 Pac. 334 (1931); Norwood v. Tellico River Lumber Co.,
146 Tenn. 682, 244 S. W. 490 (1922) ; Cox v. United States Coal & Coke Co., 80
W. Va. 295, 92 S. E. 559 (1917). But cf. Lamm v. Silver Falls Timber Co., 133
Ore. 468, 277 Pac. 91 (1929), rev'd on rehearing, 286 Pac. 527 (1930), rehearing
denied, 291 Pac. 375 (1930), dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
282 U. S. 812, 51 Sup. Ct. 214, 75 L. ed. 727 (1931) ; Varrelmann v. Flora Logging
Co., 133 Ore. 541, 277 Pac. 97 (1929), rezv'd oo rehearing, 286 Pac. 541 (1930),
rehearing denied, 290 Pac. 751 (1930), dismissed for want of substantial federal
question, 282 U. S. 413, 51 Sup. Ct. 214, 75 L. ed. 728 (1931) ; Kirby Lumber Co.
v. Scurlock, 112 Tex. Civ. App. 115, 246 S. W. 76 (1922). Contra: Gordon v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 287 S. W. 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (adversely criticised
(1927) 5 TEx. L. Rxv. 294-300).
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time of the injury as determining the legal status of the parties, that is,
whether the injury is so connected with the employment relationship
as to make the relation of the parties, so far as their legal rights are
concerned, that of employer and employee or that of strangers.1 For
example, assume that employer and employee are both pleasure driving
on the highway in their respective automobiles, and the employee is
injured by the negligence of the employer. The Act passed to compen-
sate for industrial accidents would clearly have no relation to such a
situation, and the injured one should have the same common law rights
to recovery as any third party stranger. No case as extreme as this
has been found, doubtless because it is so obvious, but it was on this
basis that recovery was sustained in the closer cases where the issue was
litigated.8
The short opinion in the principal case does not make it clear what
position North Carolina has taken.9 It is stated that the plaintiff made
no appeal from the ruling of the Industrial Commission denying him
compensation on the ground that his injury did not arise out of and in
the course of his employment. This ruling is supported by convincing
authority elsewhere on facts similar to those in the principal case, and
hence, so far as recovery under the Act was concerned, the plaintiff's
7Wirta v. North Butte Mining Co., 64 Mont. 279, 210 Pac. 332 (1922), and
cases cited in note 7, supra. Cf. Knowles v. Bureau, 52 N. D. 563, 203 N. W. 895 at
897 (1925). Consider the similar problem raised as to whether an employee of a
railroad while riding thereon for his own purposes is an employee or a passenger.
Simmons v. Oregon R. Co., 41 Ore. 151, 69 Pac. 440 (1902) ; Putnam v. Pacific
Monthly Co., 68 Ore. 36, 136 Pac. 835 (1913); see Lamm v. Silver Falls Timber
Co., 133 Ore. 468, 291 Pac. 375 (1930) (where rehearing was denied but this
problem was well discussed). Similarly where railroad employees are injured
out of hours while using cars as sleeping quarters. Moyse v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 41 Mont. 272, 108 Pac. 1062 (1910). Consider also the similar problem at com-
mon law where an employee is injured by fellow servants while outside the direct
scope of his employment, and it is sought to defeat recovery by the claim that the
master and servant relationship existing would deprive him of his recovery as a
third party. Dwan v. Great Eastern, Lumber Co., 15 Ga. App. 108, 82 S. E. 666
(1914) ; Holliday v. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co., 32 Ga. App. 567,
124 S. E. 89 (1924).
s Cases cited in note 7, supra. In Collins v. Troy Laundry Co., 135 Ore. 580,
297 Pac. 334, 336 (1931) the court said: "'When plaintiff left her employer's build-
ing and reached a public street, on no business connected with her employer, she
was a free agent and might choose to go hither or yon. She ceased to be a unit
of her employer's force and became simply a unit of the general public. She was
under no more restriction than any other member of the general public using that
part of the street." In Cox v. United States Coal & Coke Co., 80 W. Va. 295, 92
S. E. 559 (1917) the court said: "But it was surely not the purpose of the Legisla-
ture to relieve an employer from liability for a negligent act causing injury to one
of his employees who happens not at that particular moment to be engaged in
performing labor for him. The construction of the statute contended for would
destroy a long-existing common-law right without giving anything in return there-
for. It would be both unwise in poliy as tending to promote carelessness among
employers, and repugnant to justic." \
The court cites and follows the case of Pilley v. Cotton Mills, 201 N. C. 426,
160 S. E. 479 (1931) which apparently was similar to the instant case, but the
opinion in that case is also short and of little assistance.
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failure to appeal would appear well advised.1 0 Recovery, if any, would
have to be at common law. jurisdictional findings of the Commission
are not binding,:" and the fact that an employee mistakenly, and hence
unsuccessfully, attempts to recover under the Act is generally held to be
no bar to a subsequent common law action.12 Yet in the principal case
the Court denied the plaintiff's right to sue at common law without de-
ciding why he was bound by the Act or whether he was an employee
at the time of the accident. This would appear to mean that North
Carolina may deny common law rights between the parties in all cases
"The following cases would appear to be authority fo: the ruling of the Indus-
trial Commission, but do not involve the issue of common law recovery against
the employer. Vickers v. Ala. Power Co., 218 Ala. 140, 117 So. 650 (1928)
(employee injured using employer's saw for making tool box for himself; no
express permission); Mann v. Glastonbury Knitting Co., 90 Conn. 116, 96 Atl.
649 (1928) ; Vitas v. Grace Hospital Society, 107 Conn. 512, 141 Atl. 368 (1928)
(employee injured while pressing her own curtains during noon hour; injury
occurred during period of employment, at place she might reasonably be, but did
not "arise out of" her employment; emphasis on question of permission) ; Otto v.
Chapin, 243 Mich. 256, 220 N. W. 661 (1928) ; Lybolt v. Hinman, 85 N. H. 262,
157 Atl. 579 (1931) (injured while using employer's steam shovel after hours for
own benefit; no mention of permission) ; Dally v. Bates, 224 N. Y. 120, 120 N. E.
118 (1918) (laundress injured while doing her own work after quitting time) ;
Strand v. Harris Structural Steel Co., 209 App. Div. 310, 204 N. Y. Supp 463
(3d Dept. 1924); Lucky-Kidd Mining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 110
Okla. 27, 236 Pac. 600 (1925); El Reno Mill & Elevator Co. v. Kennedy, 149
Okla. 303, 300 Pac. 382 (1931) (injured on employer's saw while using for own
benefit) ; Hinton Laundry Co. v. DeLozier, 143 Tenn. 399, 225 S. W. 1034 (1920)
(employee injured pressing skirt for co-employee after hours; permission; held,
no award; did not "arise out of her employment or while performing any service
for the defendant, or in any service in which it was interested . . . the service
was purely voluntary ... for the accommodation of a fellow employee") ; Traders
& General Insurance Co. v. Ratcliff, 54 S. W. (2d) 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932);
Radtke Bros. v. Industrial Commission, 174 Wis. 212, 183 N. W. 168 (1921) (no
permission). But cf. Sheffield v. Atlantic Refining Co., 34 Ga. App. 303, 129 S. E.
667 (1925); Knowles v. Bureau, 52 N. D. 563, 203 N. W. 895 (1925).
1 Conrad v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 107 Ohio St. 387, 140 N. E. 482
(1923) ; Ayecock v. Cooper, 202 N. C. 500, 163 S. E. 569 (1932).
"State v. District Court, 136 Minn. 151, 161 N. W. 388 (1917) ; Liverani v.
John T. Clark & Son, 191 App. Div. 337, 181 N. Y. Supp. 696 (2d Dept. 1920) ;
Conrad v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 107 Ohio St. 387, 140 N. E. 482 (1926)
(Seems to be particularly in point. Employee was killed after working hours
while riding on employer's car, transportation not furnished by employer. The
Industrial Commission denied compensation on the ground that at the time of the
injury the deceased was not engaged as an employee. The administratrix then
sued at common law. The defendant claimed that the attempted recovery under
the Act was an election. The Ohio court sustained plaintiff's action at common
law saying (140 N. E. 482 at 484), "Conceivably a case might be presented where
an injured party is entitled to redress where the facts determining the forum are
extremely uncertain. Shall a mistake in the choice of a forum preclude the party
from thereafter seeking the true one? The Commission's jurisdiction extends
only to those employees and employers covered by the act. If the injury was not
occasioned at a time when the employee's relationship existed, the further exercise
of jurisdiction by the Commission ceased. It could make no award. Its finding
was equivalent to a judgment that the applicant had sought the wrong forum for
his remedy, and was in effect a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.") ; Bringardner
v. Rollins, 102 W. Va. 66, 135 S. E. 662 (1926). Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
915. See also N. C. WORKMEN'S ComPEN sAmoN Acr §24 (b).
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where the Industrial Commission finds that the injury does not arise
out of and in the course of the employment, or that an employee loses
the right to occupy the position of a third party stranger with respect
to his employer by choosing the Industrial Commission as a forum.
However, although the Court made no mention of any earlier case
between the parties, and specifically stated that the plaintiff made no
appeal from the finding of the Industrial Commission, 13 it appears that
the same parties, relative to the same accident, had been before the
Court previously on an appeal from a similar ruling of the Industrial
Commission.14 The history of the litigation appears to be that, after
receiving the injury, the plaintiff first applied to the Industrial Com-
mission for award under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Com-
mission ruled that the plaintiff did not receive an injury arising out of
and in the course of the employment as he was not an employee at the
time of the accident.' 5 From this ruling the plaintiff appealed to the
Superior Court, which reversed the award of the Commission, held that
the plaintiff was an employee at the time of the accident, received an
injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and ordered
that the plaintiff 'be paid compensation in accordance with provisions of
the Act. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court.1 0  The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court on the holding that the plaintiff
was an employee at the time of the accident, but reversed the lower
court's judgment directing an award to be made to the plaintiff for com-
pensation. The reversal was on the ground that the Industrial Commis-
sion alone had jurisdiction to determine the defendant's liability. This
was the first case between the parties, relative to the same accident, and
it was not referred to in the principal case.
The plaintiff then applied to the Industrial Commission a second
time. The Commission again refused compensation on the ground that
the plaintiff did not receive an injury arising out of and in the course
of his employment. 1" Plaintiff made no appeal from this last ruling,18
but brought the present suit at common law.
The language of the Court is misleading. Francis v. Wood Turning Co., 208
N. C. 517, 518, 181 S. E. 628 (1935) ("Shortly after he was injured, the plaintiff
instituted a proceeding before the North Carolina Industrial Commission....
Plaintiff did not appeal from the award denying compensation.")
" Francis v. Wood Turning Co., 204 N. C. 701, 169 S. E. 654 (1933).
'Francis v. Wood Turning Co., N. C. Ind. Comm. Docket No. 2269 (Aug. 15,
1932).
"Francis v. Wood Turning Co., 204 N. C. 701, 169 S. E. 654 (1933).
'Francis v. Wood Turning Co., N. C. Ind. Comm. Docket No. 2269 (Oct. 5,
1933). The distinction between this award and the award of the Industrial Com-
mission in the first case (Docket No. 2269, Aug. 15, 1932) would appear to be that
the first award was a finding of no jurisdiction, whereas the second was a denial of
compensation on the merits. The first hearing of the Commission denied com-
pensation on the ground that plaintiff did not receive an injury arising out of
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If the two cases may properly be taken together it is believed that
the principal case is not subject to the construction first put upon it
here. Considered alone it seemed to lead to the conclusion that an
employee could never occupy the position of a third party stranger with
respect to his employer, or that he lost that position by first applying
to the Commission. But considered in connection with the previous
litigation it appears that the holding in the principal case was but a
necessary consequence of the former decision. In the first case the
Court had given the plaintiff a hearing on the question of his relation-
ship to his employer at the time of the accident, and decided that he
was an employee. That decision determined the question of jurisdiction
and decided that the Industrial Commission was the proper forum for
the litigation. Plaintiff's legal status, with regard to that particular
accident, was then fixed permanently. Hence in the principal case,
since it bad already been determined that the plaintiff's position was that
of an employee and not that of a third party, he was restricted to
recovery under the Act and denied the right to maintain an action at
common law.
The result of the two cases is to place the plaintiff in the unfortunate
position of not being able to recover either under the Act or at common
law. This would seem to mean that there is a zone in which injuries,
although not arising out of and in the course of the employment so as
to be compensable under the Act, are nevertheless so closely connected
with the employment relationship that the legal status of the parties
with regard to the injuries is that of employer and employee and not
that of strangers, with the result that the employee is also barred at com-
mon law. On the merits of the principal case something might be said
in favor of such a category, 19 but no cases to support it have been found
and in the course of his employment as he was not an employee at the time of
the accident. The award would necessarily be the same if the accident was still
further dissociated from the employment, as in the illustrative case of the high-
way accident where clearly the plaintiff would not be an employee at the time of
the accident and the Industrial Commission would have no jurisdiction. At the
second hearing, however, the Supreme Court had determined that the Industrial
Commission did have jurisdiction, hence the award the second time was a denial
of compensation on the merits.
"' There was no use to appeal from this award for the Supreme Court had
already passed on the only issue on which the plaintiff could reasonably have
appealed, that is, whether or not he was an employee at the time of the accident,
and had specifically denied the power of the Superior Court to order compensation
to be paid under the provisions of the Act.
" The facts appear to be that the plaintiff, a boy of about seventeen, had been
employed by the defendant for several months past. The accident occurred about
the middle of the week. Plaintiff had worked and been paid up to and including
the Saturday before the accident, 'but on the day he was hurt and for a few days
preceding he had been around the mill working on a table for his grandmother.
He would have been subject to call if any work had arisen in his line, but it did
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from other states. 20
It is suggested that the Court in the first case between the parties
did not give proper consideration to the consequences of that decision.
An inspection of authority from other jurisdictions would have shown
that the plaintiff was practically sure to lose if his case was remanded
not. Plaintiff had gotten express permission from the defendant's manager,
Stearns (co-defendant in this action), to use a rip saw to complete the work on
his table. His regular work did not include the use of the saw, but apparently he
had had some experience with it. Defendant encouraged employees to do their own
work when off duty. There was conflicting evidence on whether the saw was
equipped with a safety appliance. If so, plaintiff did not use the safety guard.
Thus the plaintiff, if he was not an employee, was certainly not in the position of
a paying business guest. He was a bare licensee, or at most an invitee, using the
premises for his own purposes and benefit. Such a privilege would scarcely have
been extended to a third party stranger. For him to sue in such a situation is like
biting the hand that feeds him, and gives a sympathetic jury a chance to impose
an unjust penalty on the defendant. This, however, is an indictment of the jury
system. In theory at least, since there was alleged negligence on the part of the
defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to a trial.
Consider the problem of the degree of care owed and the liability for negligence
where driver of an automobile gratuitously gives a ride to a hitchhiker. Likewise
in the case of bailments, where the bailment is gratuitous and for exclusive
benefit of the bailee.
Counsel for plaintiff argued that the complaint was good against the defendant
Stearns, manager of the defendant company, who had given plaintiff permission
to use the saw. On this point see Landrum v. Middaugh, 117 Ohio St. 608, 160 N.
E. 691 (1927), holding that the acts of a foreman if within the regular course of his
employment, and not willful or malicious, are the acts of the employer, and the
defense of the Workman's Compensation Act is available. But cf. Charchill v.
Stephens, 91 N. J. L. 195, 102 Atl. 657 (1917) (where action by employee against
negligent foreman was sustained. The court said, "It is said that the defendant is
not a 'third person' within the meaning of the act. We see no reason for at-
tributing to the words 'third person' any other meaning than the usual one. It
must mean . . . a person other than the employer or employee."); Webster v.
Stewart, 219 Mich. 13, 177 N. W. 230 (1920) (suit by employee against president
director of employer company).
'In Kirby Lumber Co. v. Scurlock, 112 Tex. App. 115, 246 S. W. 76 (1922),
employee was killed by a train of the defendant, employer, while the employee was
riding home on a velocipede, not furnished by defendant, on defendant's tramroad.
The accident occurred one-and-a-half miles from defendant's mill on a day when
the employee was not working. The court reversed a common law judgment,
which they had previously affirmed in favor of the plaintiff (229 S. W. 975(1921)),
on the ground that the deceased was an employee at the time of the injury, and
hence recovery was restricted to that under the Act. The court said the injury
arose in the course of the employment, but did not say that it arose "out of" the
employment. Whether or not plaintiff subsequently recovered under the Act is
not known. If the Industrial Commission should have denied an award, the case
would appear to fall into the category of the principal case suggested above. It
is submitted that the Commission might have denied an award on at least three
grounds, to wit, that the injury was received: (1) after hours when the employee
was using the employer's premises for his own benefit (see cases cited in note 11) ;(2) while the employee was going from work by means of transportation not
furnished by the employer [Hunt v. State, 201 N. C. 707, 161 S. E. 203 (1931) ;
Bray v. Weatherly & Co., 203 N. C. 160, 165 S. E. 332 (1932) ] ; (3) "in the course
of" but not "arising out of" the employment, (Vitas v. Grace Hospital Society,
107 Conn. 512, 141 Atl. 368 (1928) ; In re Sanderson's Case, 224 Mass. 558, 113
N. E. 355 (1916); Lucky-Kidd Mining Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 110
Okla. 27, 236 Pac. 600 (1925) ; cf. Davis. v. Veneer Corp., 200 N. C. 263, 156 S. E.
859 (1931); Hunt v. State, supra.) On the other hand the Commission might
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to the Commission, 21 though it does not appear that this point was urged
on the Court. His only chance then to recover or even get a hearing
on the question of the defendant's negligence22 would be to sue at com-
mon law. The Court precluded this by fixing his status as that of an
employee.
FRANKLIN S. CLARK.
have allowed an award on the ground that using the employer's tramroad was an
incident or hazard of the employment. Lamm v. Silver Falls Timber Co., 133
Ore. 468, 286 Pac. 527 (1930).
Another situation which might conceivably present such a case would be where
an employee driving a conveyance furnished by the employer was injured by the
negligent and defective equipment of such conveyance at a time when the employee
had deviated so substantially from his legitimate course as to be barred from
recovery under the Act on the ground that the injury did not arise out of and in
the course of the employment. If he should then sue his employer at common
law, the question might be raised whether, on account of the close connection be-
tween the injury and the employment relationship, his legal status should be that
of an employee or of a stranger.
Cases from other states show that plaintiff had a poor chance to get an award
for compensation from the Industrial Commission even though he was held to be
an employee at the time of the accident. See cases cited in note 11, supra. The
North Carolina Industrial Commission recognized this in their opinion on plain-
tiff's first proceeding before them. Francis v. Wood Turning Co., D. 2269. ("In
as much as the plaintiff was performing work purely for his own personal benefit
there is a serious question as to whether the case would be compensable even if
the Commission should find that he was an employee.")
n'Another consequence of the decision was to deprive the plaintiff of ever
getting a trial on the question of the defendant's negligence. The judgment that
he was an employee restrictd'his recovery to the Act, and under the Act negligence
is no issue. Industrial Commission of Colo. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 64 Colo.
480, 174 Pac. 589 (1918) ; Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128
N. E. 711 (1920) ; Stasmas v. R. I. Coal Mining Co., 80 Okla. 221, 195 Pac. 762
(1921).
' Whether the question of the employment relationship is for the court or for
the jury, or both, see El Reno Broom Co. v. Roberts, 138 Kan. 235, 281 Pac. 273
(1929) ; Wirta v. North Butte Mining Co., 64 Mont. 279, 210 Pac. 332 (1922);
Echert v. Merchants Shipbuilding Corp., 280 Pa. St. 340, 124 Atl. 477 (1924).
